Why Pakistan overhauled its military command structure after five decades

Published On 4 Sep 20264 Sep 2026.

Key points

• The National Assembly on August 20 approved the Defence Forces of Pakistan Act, 2026, and an amendment to the National Command Authority Act, 2010.
• General Syed Aamer Raza was appointed the first CNSC in July 2026, promoted from lieutenant general to fill the post, having previously served as Chief of General Staff.
• The changes come just over a year after Pakistan's four-day conflict with India in May 2025.
• In its place is a Defence Forces Headquarters (DFHQ), headed by the CDF, at present Field Marshal Asim Munir.
• This person is additionally a former president of the National Institute of Maritime Affairs, an Islamabad-based think tank.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan's parliament in late August passed legislation that, for the first time, spells out in statute the powers of the country's most senior military office, continuing a restructuring of the military's command structure that began with last November's 27th constitutional amendment.

Meanwhile, the National Assembly on August 20 approved the Defence Forces of Pakistan Act, 2026, and an amendment to the National Command Authority Act, 2010. Together, the two laws offer legal shape to the office of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), created through that amendment last year.

Meanwhile, the bills were not on the National Assembly's original agenda; the cabinet cleared them that morning, and they passed within hours. The 27th amendment moved through parliament in a similarly compressed timeframe last November.

Notably, the changes come just over a year after Pakistan's four-day conflict with India in May 2025.

When the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) was created to coordinate, in a limited way, between the army, navy and air force, analysts say the changes mark the most significant restructuring of Pakistan's higher military command since 1976.

That post has now been abolished. In its place is a Defence Forces Headquarters (DFHQ), headed by the CDF, at present Field Marshal Asim Munir. This person additionally serves as army chief.

Al Jazeera sent questions to the military's media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations, regarding the rationale behind the changes and how the navy and air force will be represented at the new headquarters. It received no response.

Pakistan's military, and the army in particular, has dominated the country's political life since independence in 1947, staging four coups and ruling directly for more than three decades.

No elected prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term. The new legislation formalises a degree of authority the army chief has often held informally.

So what exactly do the new laws change, and what could they mean for the balance of power between Pakistan's civilian administration and its military? Al Jazeera examines the key questions. How is the CDF role different from the old CJCSC?

In practice, the CJCSC was designed as a coordinator, not a commander. It had no authority to act on the navy or air force, and each service largely ran its own affairs.

In practice, the new law changes that. It gives the CDF "operational command and control of the Armed Forces", making him responsible to the federal administration for military operations throughout all three services, not just the army.

For context, a Rawalpindi-based retired three-star general, speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the subject, described the new arrangement as a genuine, codified chain of command for the first time: the prime minister, then the CDF and his new headquarters, then the individual service chiefs, and finally formations on the ground.

"The CJCSC never had that kind of codified, statutory operational grip, " he informed Al Jazeera.

That authority means little, other officers argue, unless it comes with the power to enforce it.

"Any command is ineffective if the commander cannot incentivise or disincentivise, " remarked Naeem Khalid Lodhi, a retired three-star general and former defence secretary. "The Commander of the Defence Forces is now a real commander, and that has been properly formalised through this legislation."

Under the earlier arrangement, "there were no arrangements whereby the office holder could take any action with respect to the air force or the navy", Lodhi informed Al Jazeera. "He could act within the army, but now it is all-encompassing."

Abdul Moiz Jaferii, a Karachi-based lawyer, remarked the old coordinating post had, in practice, become largely symbolic well before it was formally abolished.

"In practice, this became a ceremonial position with little more than post office authority due to the hegemony of the army within the hierarchy, " Jaferii informed Al Jazeera. Is Pakistan's military command becoming too army-centric?

Whether the new authority upsets the balance between the three services is the question dividing Pakistan's defence establishment.

Under the new law, the Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), the post overseeing the country's nuclear-capable forces, must come from the army and is appointed on the CDF's recommendation.

General Syed Aamer Raza was appointed the first CNSC in July 2026, promoted from lieutenant general to fill the post, having previously served as Chief of General Staff. The navy and air force are excluded from the post altogether.

"Since the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was a rotational post, its abolition also means the Commander of the National Strategic Command will remain a four-star appointment, but will now come exclusively from the army, " remarked Majid Nizami, a Lahore-based strategic analyst. "A four-star officer from the navy or the air force reaching that post has been formally closed off."

Meanwhile, the CJCSC could, in theory, be filled by an officer from any of the three services. In practice, the last non-army officer to hold the post was Air Chief Marshal Farooq Feroze Khan. This person left the role in 1997.

Notably, the Rawalpindi-based retired three-star general was more blunt regarding where that leaves the balance of power.

"The institutional centre of gravity of the new system is unmistakably army-centric, " he remarked.

In practice, a former senior military official who served in a strategic planning role, speaking anonymously since he was not authorised to comment publicly, stated the shift could affect careers throughout the navy and air force.

"Since all senior positions in the three services would now be approved by the CDF, it may eventually erode the individual identity of the other two services, " the Islamabad-based official informed Al Jazeera. Promotions decided "by someone else who is not from their service" risked breeding resentment, he continued.

Meanwhile, the risk, remarked Ahmed Saeed, a retired vice admiral, is most acute for the navy.

Pakistan's sea-based deterrent depends on sound technical judgement, communications at sea, and the demands of submerged, surface and air platforms that the navy institutionally understands and the army does not, according to Saeed. This person is additionally a former president of the National Institute of Maritime Affairs, an Islamabad-based think tank.

This point is more related to two aspects. It are how proportionately the services will be interlaced into the CDF HQ decision-making loop and how much operational leverage services chiefs will enjoy at the top level, he remarked.

"The risk isn't dilution of control, " he remarked. "It's that assurance and survivability arguments get subordinated to a land-centric concept of deterrence." Lodhi acknowledged the concern but remarked it was not new.

He remarked he had previously suggested that the position overseeing strategic forces rotate between the three services, rather than remain fixed with the army, and that senior officers from each service be designated as potential successors to the CDF.

"That, too, may come later, " he remarked, adding that the rules of business still to be finalised could require the CDF to act only on the recommendation of the respective air or naval chief. Where does this leave nuclear command? The new law additionally indirectly touches Pakistan's nuclear command structure.

For context, an Islamabad-based defence analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity around Pakistan's nuclear programme, remarked the CDF is now anticipated to serve as deputy chairman of the National Command Authority (NCA), the body that oversees Pakistan's nuclear weapons and is chaired by the prime minister.

Notably, the army additionally set up a separate command last year, the Army Rocket Force Command, to handle conventional missile strikes that fall outside the nuclear chain of command.

"This creates a clear separation between strategic deterrence and conventional missile operations that previously sat in an ambiguous space, " the analyst remarked.

Meanwhile, the military official who has served in a strategic planning role remarked the Strategic Aims Division (SPD) is projected to retain that role, working "under the new appointment of CNSC" rather than being absorbed by it.

Notably, the SPD is the military department that has run Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes for more than two decades.

Taken together, the developments around why Pakistan overhauled its military command structure after five decades point to a situation that is still moving, and the coming days should bring more clarity.