Jhiram Ghati, turning point in the battle inside Red Corridor
Jhiram Ghati, turning point in the battle inside Red Corridor The attack came at a crucial point in the evolution of the counter-Maoist strategy and, according to security establishment authorities involved in operations in Bastar at that time, concluded up…
Jhiram Ghati, turning point in the battle inside Red Corridor The attack came at a crucial point in the evolution of the counter-Maoist strategy and, according to security establishment authorities involved in operations in Bastar at that time, concluded up reinforcing rather.
Article outline
- What happened
- Official response
- Background
- Why it matters
- The key numbers
- The bottom line
Key points
- The massacre in Chhattisgarh's Jhiram Ghati on May 25, 2013 was among the most audacious attacks carried out by Maoists.
- 5 min read New Delhi Sep 6, 2026 04: 30 AM IST.
- A senior CRPF officer remarked the campaign acquired a sharper momentum after Amit Shah took charge as Union Home Minister in 2019.
- Outside the NIA special court at Jagdalpur in Chhattisgarh's Bastar district on Saturday.
- While Jhiram Ghati was not the beginning of the end of Maoist violence, the incident was a turning point in the political understanding of the conflict.
Outside the NIA special court at Jagdalpur in Chhattisgarh's Bastar district on Saturday. (ANI video grab).
Notably, the massacre in Chhattisgarh's Jhiram Ghati on May 25, 2013 was among the most audacious attacks carried out by Maoists. While there had been attacks with higher casualties – the 2010 Tadmetla attack, for instance, killed 76 CRPF personnel – Jhiram Ghati had a different impact. For the first time, Maoists had virtually wiped out an entire generation of a state's political leadership in one strike.
Among those killed were then Chhattisgarh Congress president Nand Kumar Patel and his son Dinesh, former Leader of Opposition Mahendra Karma, former Union Minister Vidya Charan Shukla and former MLA Uday Mudliyar.
By then, the Centre had already begun mounting sustained pressure on the Maoists. In 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had described Maoist violence as the country's biggest internal security threat. When P Chidambaram became Union Home Minister in 2008, the government's resolve to tackle the insurgency had hardened.
For context, the strategy that emerged was broadly described as "clear, hold and develop". Security forces would enter Maoist strongholds, push them out, establish camps to hold the territory and allow the civil administration to follow with roads, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure.
In Bastar, nevertheless, this was a slow and challenging process. In early 2013, security forces had set up a camp at Minapa in Sukma. It was a sign that security forces were beginning to move into the Maoist core areas. The Maoists were increasingly being forced into battles inside territory they had traditionally dominated. 13 years after Jhiram Ghati attack, NIA court convicts 10 Maoists. It was against this backdrop that Jhiram Ghati took place.
"The Jhiram Ghati massacre was planned as a way to disrupt this forward march by rattling the political establishment. But it only solidified the resolve as the Centre was now convinced that the strategy of setting up bases inside Maoist core areas was right, " remarked a senior security establishment officer who was in Chhattisgarh then.
For context, the attack additionally had a particularly symbolic target in Mahendra Karma. This person had been closely associated with Salwa Judum, the controversial anti-Maoist mobilisation rolled out in 2005 in which tribal civilians were armed and organised to fight Maoists.
In 2011, the Supreme Court restrained the state from continuing the practice of arming tribal youth as Special Police Officers to fight the insurgents, effectively striking down the model.
He was a Maoist leader. His 'experience' has landed him a university role.
For context, the Jhiram Ghati incident additionally exposed another weakness in the "clear, hold and develop" approach: the state's security footprint was expanding faster than its administrative footprint.
Security camps could be established deep inside the forests, but roads and communications often did not follow. In 2022, the CRPF remarked 331 km of roads sanctioned in the Sukma-Bijapur-Dantewada region in 2010 remained only concerning 50 per cent complete. Some projects sanctioned in 2012 had barely progressed.
"The Jhiram Ghati attack quickened the pace. It convinced the political class that they too could come under attack and so the matter was taken more seriously, " another security establishment officer remarked.
There were additionally more immediate operational lessons. One was the need for night evacuation. Helicopters had earlier generally not flown into these areas at night since of the challenging terrain and poor visibility. But after the Jhiram Ghati attack, the victims were evacuated through the night. Security forces subsequently pushed for similar capabilities for their own personnel, and night sorties gradually became routine.
In practice, the Maoists are gone. Chhattisgarh village is learning what freedom looks like. The larger transformation, nevertheless, came afterwards.
Meanwhile, a senior CRPF officer remarked the campaign acquired a sharper momentum after Amit Shah took charge as Union Home Minister in 2019. "He took keen interest in injecting pace. The Maoists were already fighting a losing battle, but he wanted to create their defeat decisive and quick. He would personally speak to Chief Ministers and state police, extend full backing to the Central forces and provide them a free hand in dealing with Maoist violence. He personally drove coordination between the Central and state forces and the civil administration, " the officer remarked.
Meanwhile, the results of that sustained strategy are now visible. More than 15, 000 km of roads have been built to take security forces into forested interiors, over 9, 000 mobile towers have been installed and almost 200 new security camps have come up in core Maoist areas. Left Wing Extremist-related incidents and deaths have fallen by more than four-fifths since 2010.
While Jhiram Ghati was not the beginning of the end of Maoist violence, the incident was a turning point in the political understanding of the conflict. The attack demonstrated that Maoists could retaliate spectacularly when the state pushed into their core areas. But instead of forcing the state to retreat, it convinced the political establishment that retreat was no longer an option.
Taken together, the developments around jhiram Ghati, turning point in the battle inside Red Corridor point to a situation that is still moving, and the coming days should bring more clarity.



