Explained: Why is everyone so mad about Karachi province?

Explained: Why is everyone so mad regarding Karachi province? A simple backgrounder to a complex history.

Key points

• Dr Asma Faiz Published September 9, 2026 Updated September 9, 2026 02: 16pm.
• When Partition took place, Sindh had already operated as a fully-fledged province for a decade after it was separated from Bombay in 1936.
• The second injury to the identity of Sindh came in the shape of One Unit (1955).
• Partition caused the first injury in 1947 when it shook the foundations of Sindh's demography and power structure.
• The late 1970s onwards, Sindh has stood out from the other provinces since it has had unique competing nationalist movements.

Talk of Pakistan's territorial reconfiguration is back in circulation again with mention of the division of Sindh producing the most bile.

It was all began by the interior minister who informed businessmen in Islamabad last month that he mourned the collapse of Pakistan's "outdated governance system". Urgent reforms were needed, he argued, if Pakistan wanted to avoid blowback from "cockroaches" (Gen-Z agitating in India). Our salvation lay in the decentralization of governance which could be achieved by creating new administrative units (read: provinces).

Individuals who produce a case for new provinces argue that the existing ones are too sizeable to manage and there is too much distance between the administration and the individuals. Smaller units would be more efficiently governed and would thus bring the seat of power closer to the individuals.

Some commentators took his remarks rather seriously and began to earnestly do the math, running numeric options for a new 'right-sized' and reconfigured Federation of Pakistan: 5, 8, 10, 12 provinces, depending on which flavour of administrative reform you liked. South Punjab, Greater Karachi, Seraiki province, Hazara province. And secretly everyone wondered if the minister's rhetoric had wafted down from the rarefied exosphere of the supra-political elite.

Three groups have created their preferences clear over the question. The Establishment seems to be in the mood for 'right-sizing' the state. Political parties have expressed mixed views. And nationalist parties, particularly from Sindh, have resisted it.

Sindh has been the angriest. Its house of elected representatives passed an unequivocal resolution against any proposal to change the boundaries of the province. What explains this reaction and what is the history to this sentiment?

When Partition took place, Sindh had already operated as a fully-fledged province for a decade after it was separated from Bombay in 1936. And with independence in 1947, it regained the old feeling of distinct territorial existence which it had experienced before the arrival of the British in 1843. This rejuvenated consciousness tinged with pride of belonging to one of the oldest civilizations in the world, the Indus Valley, created Sindhis particularly sensitive to their restored ethno-territorial identity.

That is why today you cannot mention a 'Karachi province' without picking the scab off a particularly old wound.

Partition caused the first injury in 1947 when it shook the foundations of Sindh's demography and power structure. In a blink of an eye, its middle class mainly created up of Hindus emptied out as they fled to India and were replaced by Muhajirs coming from India. And then the federal administration decided to take Karachi as the country's capital, strip it of its provincial capital status and name Hyderabad instead. This was the catalyst for Sindhi nationalism. It went on to challenge the new State's national project by insisting on ethnic identity and territoriality.

Meanwhile, the second injury to the identity of Sindh came in the shape of One Unit (1955). With the stroke of a pen, the federal administration created the two provinces of East and West Pakistan to establish what was at best an artificial parity between the two wings of a country. The creation of a mega province in West Pakistan was a disaster as it offered rise to resistance in the shape of ethnic nationalisms in the three minority provinces of Pakistan. Suppression of the sub-national identity of language as a primordial loyalty of individuals led to a fully-fledged nationalist movement in East Pakistan.

Not surprisingly, the National Awami Party as a representative of Pakhtun and Baloch nationalisms and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) as a representative of Sindhi nationalism formed governments in these provinces after the 1970 elections (and creation of Bangladesh in 1971). The message was clear. You tinker with ethnolinguistic identity, you lead to a tsunami of mass mobilization.

Spearheading this agitation were the famous 'sons-of-the-soil' such as G. M. Syed, Ibrahim Joyo, Shaikh Ayaz and Rasul Baksh Paleejo. After twenty years of mass resistance, General Yayha was obliged to undo the decision and create Karachi the capital of Sindh back again in 1970, and bring an end to the One Unit, finally.

In practice, the late 1970s onwards, Sindh has stood out from the other provinces since it has had unique competing nationalist movements. In fact, Sindh remains the most ethnically polarized province of Pakistan, making the question of territorial reorganization all the more tough to grapple with. Muhajirs have strongly reacted to policies such as the 1972 declaration of Sindhi as an official language, a 60: 40 quota for civil service and educational institute admissions favouring rural Sindh and the nationalisation of industries and universities.

Thus the PPP and Sindhi nationalist groups sit at one end of the opinion spectrum and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) at the other.

Massive ethnic outbidding between the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists is taking place with the latter including offshoots of G. M. Syed's Jeay Sindh Mahaz. While these parties have not dominated at the ballot box, they represent the spirit of Sindhi nationalist consciousness and act as an significant pressure group on the PPP as a frontline actor in the domain of governance.

For context, the PPP has been in power in Sindh since 2008. It is a coalition partner in the ruling dispensation in Islamabad. Since its inception, it managed to connect Sindhis to the state through its electoral success. It managed to present Sindh's grievances at federal platforms such as the Council of Common Interests and National Finance Commission Awards to split funds among the provinces. It oils the security mechanism of the interests of Sindh within and beyond the provincial boundaries.

Notably, the Sindhi nationalist parties have, nevertheless, focused on identity construction through grassroots politics. They are subdued electoral entities but their influence on shaping Sindh's imaginary is robust. For instance, their opposition to the 2012 Local Administration Act that introduced a separate local bodies system in Karachi compelled the PPP administration to re-think its policy. In early 2025, a controversy erupted with the proposed construction of canals in south Punjab that would have diverted water away from Sindh. Under mass public pressure, the PPP administration was obliged to listen to the nationalist parties.

Meanwhile, the MQM has learnt that it can never be in a dominant position in Sindh due to its demographic limitations at one-fourth of the population. Since 1988, it has been a coalition partner of a number of governments and it has generally looked towards Islamabad for backing. It has been unhappy with the empowerment of provincial governments through the 18th Amendment since this means more power in the hands of the provincial majority Sindhis at the cost of the largest minority of Muhajirs.

These misgivings aside, nevertheless, the promise of devolution remains unfulfilled almost a decade and half after the passage of the amendment. Provincial governments have avoided transferring administrative and fiscal powers to local governments. The limited powers of local governments have grossly alienated the MQM. On a number of occasions, this party has demanded a federal takeover of Karachi in the name of good governance and efficient service delivery. How could it be done legally?

Article 239 (4) of the Constitution notes any change in the territorial make-up of a province needs the approval of two-thirds of a provincial assembly as well as the National Assembly and the Senate. In today's divided political landscape, it seems impossible.

This is why a referendum has been mentioned as a way to acquire 'popular' consent for smaller provinces. The history of referendums and their like conducted in Pakistan by the military governments of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf does not, nevertheless, inspire much confidence especially as they were rigged. What individuals are really scared of.

Meanwhile, the proposed division of Sindh has galvanized shades of public opinion. The nationalist parties opted for street mobilization. The PPP led the passage of a resolution in the Sindh Assembly. It seems that the creation of new provinces will have the most catastrophic consequences for Sindh. One frightening scenario is a population transfer that invokes the memory of 1947. Since Muhajirs are concentrated in urban centers, they might decide to migrate to a Muhajir-majority province (if created). This would lead to cross-migration throughout the boundaries steeped in blood. Indeed, it would lead to a storm of discontent in all parts of Sindhi society, beyond the Sindhis and Muhajirs. Is the State ready to handle such a storm?

Header image of a rubik's cube unsolvable as a Sindhi rilli generated with Gemini. Naqvi's remarks ignite fresh debate in political circles. Naqvi doubles down on demand for new provinces.

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For now, explained: Why is everyone so mad about Karachi province? Remains the part of the story worth watching, and further updates are likely as more details are confirmed.