Israelis demand accountability over 7 October failures three years after attacks

ByLucy Williamson Middle East correspondent, Reporting fromJerusalem and Kfar Aza.

Key points

• It was there, shortly after 07: 00 on 7 October 2023, that Hamas-led attackers killed half the community's 14-member civil defence squad.
• The 7 October attack was the deadliest Israel had suffered since its creation in 1948.
• She was killed with 14 other members of her unit when gunmen overran their base at Nahal Oz, just next to Kfar Aza.
• A month after the 7 October attacks, he informed a German newspaper that claims he wanted to strengthen Hamas were "an absolute lie".
• Yizhar Shai, a former minister and opposition politician whose youngest son Yaron, a soldier, was killed on 7 October, is part of that campaign.

As the sky began to lighten over Israel's border with Gaza on Wednesday, the individuals of Kfar Aza moved silently towards the armoury at the centre of the kibbutz.

It was there, shortly after 07: 00 on 7 October 2023, that Hamas-led attackers killed half the community's 14-member civil defence squad. They were among 64 killed and 19 kidnapped from the community that day.

For context, the pain of those attacks is still fresh here. But three years on, there are questions regarding who else should pay the rate for Israel's security failure.

"I need my country to take responsibility, " remarked Inbar Goldstein, whose brother and niece were killed, and four other relatives kidnapped from Kfar Aza.

For context, the 7 October attack was the deadliest Israel had suffered since its creation in 1948. Regarding 1, 200 residents were killed throughout southern Israel by gunmen who broke through the border fence and attacked communities there. Another 251 individuals were taken back to Gaza as hostages.

Three years on from Israel's biggest security failure, there is still no independent state inquiry into how it was allowed to happen.

And the man in charge at the time of that failure – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – is running for election again, with the same campaign promise: to be stronger and tougher than anyone else in protecting Israel from its enemies.

"Nobody investigated the roots. It didn't start or end on October 7th – it's a long process of abandonment, " Goldstein remarked.

Aside from Hamas's responsibility for the attack itself, there are growing questions in Israel around what caused the country's intelligence failure, what information was passed to military and political leaders in the run-up to the attacks, and what Netanyahu himself knew.

For months beforehand, young female soldiers posted at bases along the Gaza border to watch for suspicious activity had cautioned their superiors concerning feasible preparations for an attack.

Among them was Roni Eshel. She was killed with 14 other members of her unit when gunmen overran their base at Nahal Oz, just next to Kfar Aza.

"There are so many questions, " her uncle Elad Levy informed me. "Were the Egyptians warning the prime minister? The Emiratis? Were there no other warnings Netanyahu ignored? We need to find out what happened – not just on the day, but the year before, and five years before that."

"The truth should be clear, " he continued. "If we don't inquire into this, it will happen again and again."

They were Israel's 'eyes on the border' – their warnings went unheard.

As well as by regional neighbours – which he denies, over the past three years, there have been mounting reports of warnings being given to Netanyahu – by his own security chief.

Last month, Israel's Haaretz newspaper published extracts from a new book, alleging that the leader of the United Arab Emirates had called Netanyahu 10 days before the attack to warn of Hamas intends for a major operation.

Netanyahu's office has dismissed the report as "an absolute lie" and has remarked he will sue the newspaper.

Amir Ohana, a member of Netanyahu's Likud party, remarked in a social media video last month that it was "preposterous and absurd" to suggest that Netanyahu could have known concerning the attack when the former Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, had only informed a handful of residents.

Israel's prime minister, he remarked, had since reshaped the Middle East and did not provide up, "even when voices inside and outside Israel called on him to stop".

Netanyahu has blamed his own security chiefs for the failures that led to the 7 October attacks, accusing them of deliberately choosing not to wake him in the hours beforehand, for fear that he would order a massive deployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and escalate the situation.

"God forbid we wake up the prime minister and he says, 'Wake up the entire IDF immediately, scramble the air force!'" he informed Israel's right-wing Channel 14 television network.

"What would have happened if they had woken me? This would not have happened, " he remarked, suggesting that his response would have better protected Israel from the attacks.

Yaacov Katz, a journalist and author of a number of books on Israel's defence, has written concerning the growing reservations over Hamas activity that emerged in the hours leading up to the assault.

In his book, While Israel Slept, he describes calls between senior military figures and intelligence chiefs in the early hours of the morning, the sudden recall of commanders from leave, and the dispatch of an elite intelligence unit to the border.

He informed me their expectation was, at worst, a small, limited incursion by Hamas fighters.

"So why would order a massive pre-emptive strike by the IDF, if every security chief is telling him this is not what this is going to be? Waking him would not have created a difference."

But he remarked Netanyahu faced other questions concerning his failure to spot what was happening.

"You were the prime minister, you set the policy, " he remarked. "You created a doctrine and a policy of containment that trickled down to the last soldier manning the watchtower on the border with Gaza: contain Hamas, separate the Palestinians, and keep Hamas in power to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state."

For years, Netanyahu oversaw a policy of containing – not confronting – Hamas in Gaza, during which Israeli governments allowed Qatar to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of aid for Gaza.

For context, a month after the 7 October attacks, he informed a German newspaper that claims he wanted to strengthen Hamas were "an absolute lie".

"On the contrary we wanted to continue to weaken Hamas as much as we could, " he informed Die Welt. "But the money was meant to avoid a civilian catastrophe – that is the only reason."

Months after the attack, the IDF's then-chief of staff, Lt Gen Herzi Halevi, publicly apologised for the failure to defend civilians, saying he carried that weight on his shoulders and in his heart.

He resigned. A raft of military commanders were afterwards fired, and Israel's domestic intelligence chief left his position. Netanyahu has so far rejected any personal responsibility for the attacks.

Col Richard Hecht was the IDF's international spokesman on 7 October. He informed me the refusal of political leaders – including Netanyahu – to accept responsibility was part of the reason he resigned six months afterwards.

"It's a disgrace, " he informed me. "When you look at accountability, within the IDF I don't think there's a difficulty. And that's the pain. That's one of the main causes of bad blood between the political echelon and the military."

At a memorial ceremony in Jerusalem on Monday, the father of one of those killed on 7 October stood up to challenge the prime minister.

"You didn't protect my son, you didn't protect all those who were murdered, " he remarked, before security guards led him away. "Shame! Disgrace!"

Three years on from the attacks, calls for accountability are growing. Campaigners have asked Israel's highest court to force the administration into establishing a state commission of inquiry.

In short, israelis demand accountability over 7 October failures three years after attacks is the central thread here, and readers can expect follow-up reporting as the picture becomes clearer.