Suspected Israeli online operations cause alarm in Iran and Lebanon

Israeli intelligence services are believed to be turning to social media to gather information and recruit potential informants in Lebanon and Iran, according to security experts, using online and appeals tailored to local audiences.

GeneralNews Info Wire6 min read
Suspected Israeli online operations cause alarm in Iran and Lebanon

Israeli intelligence services are believed to be turning to social media to gather information and recruit potential informants in Lebanon and Iran, according to security experts, using online and appeals tailored to local audiences.

Article outline

  1. What happened
  2. The key numbers
  3. Background
  4. Official response
  5. What comes next
  6. The bottom line

Key points

  • Additionally in January 2025, Lebanon's General Security Directorate cautioned against interacting with a Facebook page called SAWA.
  • Similarly, in December 2025, another Lebanese newspaper L'Orient Today documented that the security agency had cautioned residents against interacting with a social media page calling itself "Unit 504".
  • Separately, the former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev was arrested in 2018 on accusations of spying for Iran.
  • In August 2025, Lebanon's General Security Directorate cautioned residents against interacting with the Instagram account.
  • Academic and political researcher Wissam Nassif Yassin informed Al Jazeera that Israeli intelligence uses colloquial Lebanese Arabic on these platforms to avoid arousing suspicion and to facilitate communication.

One Instagram account, presenting itself as belonging to Israel's foreign intelligence agency Mossad, has published Arabic-language messages encouraging individuals to produce contact through confidential channels.

In practice, the account, which is verified and operates under the handle @themossad_official, has posted recruitment appeals in colloquial Lebanese Arabic, including inviting individuals to explore new opportunities by initiating a private conversation.

In practice, the profile prominently features pinned highlight reels with Arabic titles such as "Lebanon" displaying a photo of fighters, "Israel", "Mossad wants you!", "Protection", and "Think about your future".

In Lebanon, where years of economic turmoil have left plenty of residents facing financial hardship, security office-holders have cautioned of suspected Israeli intelligence recruitment efforts involving social media.

In January 2025, the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar documented that Israeli intelligence operatives were attempting to recruit Lebanese citizens through fake job offering high salaries, and through direct outreach on WhatsApp.

Retired Brigadier General Mounir Chehade informed the newspaper that the recruitment efforts targeted areas with significant backing for Hezbollah, including Beirut's southern suburbs, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.

Additionally in January 2025, Lebanon's General Security Directorate cautioned against interacting with a Facebook page called SAWA. It it suspected was a Mossad front aimed at recruiting Lebanese citizens.

Notably, the page asserted to represent the Israeli military's human intelligence unit and stated it was looking for individuals interested in joining its ranks.

For context, the reservations have been accompanied by arrests of residents accused of passing sensitive information to Israel. Lebanese authorities were documented in October 2025 to have previously arrested 32 residents suspected of giving information to Israel that was applied to target Hezbollah leaders. Targeting Hezbollah's backing base.

"The Israeli side focuses on all segments of society because it considers that every person can be penetrated from their own angle, based on the fact that Hezbollah in Lebanon is integrated into the core of Lebanese society, " Yassin remarked.

"It focuses on the party's members primarily, then on the resistance environment secondarily, and on the environment surrounding it thirdly."

While Israel has had notable sucesses in its intelligence operations in Lebanon – including in gathering information leading to attacks on Hezbollah leaders and members, Yassin argued that collaboration with Israel remained widely rejected in Lebanon.

He additionally pointed to Hezbollah's own counterintelligence capabilities, arguing that the group has a long history of identifying and disrupting Israeli intelligence activity.

Yassin pointed to the case of Elhanan Tannenbaum, an alleged Israeli spy who was captured in 2000 after being lured abroad, and was published in 2004 in a prisoner exchange agreement.

Meanwhile, the employ of digital platforms to recruit potential informants additionally forms part of the longstanding intelligence war between Israel and Iran. It has intensified alongside the military conflict between the two countries.

Hassan Ahmadian, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Tehran, described the current situation as one of the most intense periods in decades-long espionage between the two countries.

"This is an intelligence war. The confrontation between Iran and Israel has continued for decades, but over recent years it has reached its peak, " Ahmadian informed Al Jazeera. "Both sides are engaged in intelligence operations. It is an intense conflict that has never halted."

According to Ahmadian, israeli recruitment efforts in Iran were sometimes carried out through openly advertised opportunities on social media.

"Israel certainly uses online advertising to recruit people, " he remarked. "When I was in Iran, I would see on social media seeking analysts or people to work in security, sometimes offering high salaries and inviting interested applicants to visit a particular page."

He suggested that openly advertising such opportunities could have a psychological goal beyond recruiting informants, in an attempt to reinforce perceptions of Israel's intelligence reach inside Iran.

"Israel uses propaganda, but this blatant method is perhaps partly to amplify the Israeli presence, " Ahmadian observed.

For context, the academic additionally pointed to cases in which Iran had conducted its own counter-operations.

In October 2024, for example, Israeli authorities confirmed the arrest of seven Israeli nationals accused of spying for Iran by gathering intelligence on military facilities and other sensitive sites.

Separately, the former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev was arrested in 2018 on accusations of spying for Iran. He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to 11 years in prison in 2019.

Authorities in Lebanon and Iran have threatened severe penalties for anyone interacting with Israeli accounts.

In July, the Iranian newspaper Kayhan documented that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence had cautioned of social media accounts allegedly set up by Mossad to extract information and spread fake news after recent security operations. The ministry asserted that Mossad even offered medical advice to residents injured during the United States-Israeli war on Iran, in an attempt to gather sensitive intelligence.

In the same month, the Iranian judiciary additionally cautioned that sending images or information to networks deemed to be hostile could result in sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison, heavy fines and potential charges of "corruption on Earth". It carries the death penalty. In Lebanon, collaboration with Israel carries a penalty of imprisonment.

As the covert conflict expands online, Ahmadian remarked that there was little indication that the confrontation would ease.

"I do not expect this intelligence war to stop at any moment between the two parties, " Ahmadian remarked, "it will remain ongoing and will continue to affect the entire conflict."

Taken together, the developments around suspected Israeli online operations cause alarm in Iran and Lebanon point to a situation that is still moving, and the coming days should bring more clarity.

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