Inside the shadowy world of anti-Putin sabotage from within Russia

ByMonica Garnsey BBC Eye.

Key points

• Of the assassination of Gen Sarvarov, killed in December 2025, he afterwards texted Mamon to say: Keeping track of him took quite an effort.
• If you are outside the UK, watch on YouTube, external and listen to the BBC World Service Documentary Podcast – Shadowmen: Russians working with Ukraine.
• The documentary, by independent Polish journalist Marcin Mamon, additionally features a man we are calling Foma, a Russian living in exile in Poland.
• The broad tactics Ivan and Foma describe, nevertheless, have been acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities.
• He features in a BBC World Service documentary regarding the shadowy world of Russian saboteurs.

Two Russian men secretly working for Ukraine's intelligence services have given rare accounts of operations they claim to have been involved with, that have targeted military assets and personnel inside Russia.

One of the men, whom we are calling Ivan, claims to have played a role from Russia in Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories on his home soil.

In practice, the documentary, by independent Polish journalist Marcin Mamon, additionally features a man we are calling Foma, a Russian living in exile in Poland.

Foma runs a network of undercover volunteers in Russia, that surveils high-level officers that the GUR – Ukraine's military intelligence service – is considering targeting, he notes. He stresses they are never involved in the attacks themselves.

He was additionally tight-lipped concerning who they were surveilling, but after Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov was assassinated in December last year in Moscow, Foma admitted he had provided the Ukrainians with intelligence on him.

There have been previous media reports of Russian sabotage groups, but it is rare to obtain access to someone operating on the ground, like Ivan, explaining alleged activities.

According to The GUR has, ivan and Foma are both working for the agency. But it additionally has acknowledged that it cannot know the full picture. When Ivan's handler was pressed on whether he could be trusted, the handler replied: "I'm not sure of anyone, except myself."

And both the GUR and the men are cautious regarding how much detail they share, making it impossible to verify the activities the men claim to have carried out.

Notably, the broad tactics Ivan and Foma describe, nevertheless, have been acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities. Kyiv has spoken of its strategy of co-ordinated drone attacks on what it claims are legitimate targets inside Russia, and has acknowledged it uses secret agents for this.

There have additionally been a number of political assassinations in Russia since the start of the war. Though a Ukrainian intelligence officer has previously admitted to the BBC it was behind the killing of senior military figure Lt Gen Igor Kirillov in December 2024, as a matter of policy, Ukraine never officially admits or claims responsibility for targeted attacks.

It is tough to confirm how numerous Russians are doing this kind of work for Ukraine. Though this is impossible to verify, according to Foma, they number regarding 300-500. Listen to the Podcast on BBC Sounds.

Ivan and Foma say they are both resisted not just to Russia's war in Ukraine, but to President Vladimir Putin's regime – and believe his political future depends on the war's outcome.

"Right now. I think the regime might fall if they lose the war. Through our actions. We are trying to speed this up, " Ivan notes.

His work, he informed Mamon, involved surveilling military sites, and locating places to hide drone components, in preparation for potential attacks on Russian assets.

"When these components are combined. It turns out a formidable weapon, which with a single blow can destroy an object that costs many, many millions of dollars, " Ivan remarked.

He sent Mamon a video which indicated him apparently hiding explosives near a Russian military airfield.

If he had been caught, he would have been charged with terrorism, and jailed for decades.

Foma's work is different – he operates remotely, training his volunteers in Russia, online. Mamon watched him conducting one such tutorial – on how to trail a senior military official marked for surveillance.

"You will obtain a file. From me or a colleague. With the proposed target. The file will contain photo, his data, his details, date of birth, age, and a description of him. There'll be information on his car, if he has one. When you go to the target, don't take a phone, " he informed his volunteers.

Foma was once part of the Russian elite, so he claims to have a unique set of contacts and constant flow of insider information. He indicated Mamon on his laptop how he mapped military targets.

This demonstrates a database. The location of storage warehouses, and military units. Where generals live. Where the pilots of strategic bombers who shell Ukraine live.

"So as to break the system, you need to understand how it works. Then you can aim for their subdued points."

He remarked there were concerning "three dozen" individuals in his network split between Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, with the contingent outside Russia providing logistical backing, such as tracking targets' digital footprints.

Foma stressed that the GUR suggests the targets to be surveilled, but that he and his team check for themselves that these individuals should be considered military criminals.

"As a rule. We additionally check the data. Only after that we say whether we work or not." But he argued that his team's actions were justified.

"I want individuals who do terrible things on behalf of Putin and Russia in Ukraine. To understand that they'll have to pay for it. I want them to obtain scared."

Foma stressed that he only passed on intelligence to the Ukrainians, and his network did not carry out any assassinations themselves.

Of the assassination of Gen Sarvarov, killed in December 2025, he afterwards texted Mamon to say: "Keeping track of him took quite an effort. He lived alternately with his mistress and his colleague. Covered his tracks and constantly changed his schedule."

But Foma did not share any intends with Mamon and the BBC in advance.

Ivan, nevertheless, was tight-lipped concerning the work he had been involved with, even after the event. Foma did his own digging on Ivan.

After checking with his military intelligence contacts in both Ukraine and Russia, he thought it probable that Ivan had been involved in a plan to strike Russia's largest military drone factory at Yelabuga in June last year, external. One person was documented to have been killed in the incident.

Ivan stressed that the aim is always to try to avoid harming civilians. Operations have clearly been risky for Ivan too.

"The most serious case was when my car was halted for inspection and I had the handmade explosives on me. The risk was particularly high – even so as you can see, I was not detected, " he noted.

To mitigate the risk of being compromised, "there is no clear structure" to the work, he remarked, adding he had never met and did not know the identity of others he had been working alongside. Foma has the same rule for his operatives.

"As soon as you start gathering people in groups, in general chats. Leaving a mark on the internet, with a high probability this whole group will be quickly detained or destroyed, " he remarked.

Ivan stressed there were few individuals left in Russia suitable for this kind of work.

"Most of the ideological people have either left the country or are already behind bars, " he remarked.

For now, inside the shadowy world of anti-Putin sabotage from within Russia remains the part of the story worth watching, and further updates are likely as more details are confirmed.