Unlearnt lessons of history

Unlearnt lessons of history.

Key points

• Maleeha Lodhi Published August 24, 2026 Updated August 24, 2026 08: 12am.
• The 18th Constitutional Amendment, backed by all parties in 2010, opened a new chapter in provincial empowerment.
• These and other actions widened interprovincial disparities, deepened alienation among smaller provinces and led to the insurgency in Balochistan in the 1970s.
• The creation of One Unit in the 1950s.
• True ethnic minorities in some provinces, such as Seraiki speakers in southern Punjab, have long wanted their own province.

Maleeha Lodhi Published August 24, 2026 Updated August 24, 2026 08: 12am. Join our Whatsapp Channel. Add Dawn as a trusted source.

TODAY, the country's hybrid administration is fixated on altering Pakistan's constitutionally mandated provincial structure and multiplying administrative units. To sell the idea, establishment apologists have rolled out some disingenuous arguments. They claim this will improve governance and miraculously solve the country's challenges overnight.

For context, a debate has been generated in the media regarding the pros and cons of administrative changes and breaking provinces into more units. Parliament has yet to discuss this. That is unsurprising. Deliberation is not this legislature's solid suit. It has rushed through constitutional amendments in record time, once in the dead of night and without meaningful debate. Meanwhile, speculation is mounting that another constitutional amendment is being prepared to push through 'administrative changes'.

Absent from the establishment's consideration of these sweeping changes are lessons from Pakistan's history. Over the decades, the country's rulers have experimented with parliamentary, presidential, semi-presidential, quasi-parliamentary systems, direct military rule, and more lately a hybrid model. It involves informal power-sharing between the military and civilians, with the former as dominant partner. Pakistan has tried them all. Yet each switch only contributed to political instability. In practice, the only system to command legitimacy and broad backing is parliamentary democracy, despite the fact that parliamentary supremacy over the executive has never been realised.

Linked to these experiments has been the status and rights of provinces in a federal system. As the provincial configuration and federating units largely coincided with the ethnic composition of individuals of each province, the need was always felt to produce federalism a reality, not just a constitutional precept to ensure the individuals of all four provinces felt they were part of an inclusive and fair system.

Pakistan's troubled history offers a cautionary lesson against altering the provincial structure.

But the federal structure and provincial rights have always been contested problems in Pakistan's history. Contested on plenty of counts. Smaller provinces have long resented Punjab's political hegemony, sought greater powers and autonomy and felt the distribution of resources has been unfair. Unelected institutions have always preferred a centralised polity while military rule meant the country functioned as a virtual unitary state. Long periods of unrepresentative rule fuelled alienation among the smaller provinces by marginalising them, suppressing regional identities, concentrating power at the centre and weakening federalism.

Meanwhile, the creation of One Unit in the 1950s. It merged all the provinces of what was then West Pakistan into a single unit, was aimed at creating 'parity' with the more populous eastern wing of the country to undercut its numerical majority. This politically motivated project imposed a unitary system and all but destroyed the country's federal character. It was justified by totally false and frivolous arguments. They included claims it would end "provincial prejudices", reduce adm­I­nistrative expenses and support develop backward areas. In practice, the move had disastrous consequences. It fanned the flames of nationalist and regionalist sentiment in the smaller provinces of West Pak­istan and strengthened centrifugal forces nationwide. It contributed to the sense of discrimination among the individuals of East Pakistan that, along with other factors, identified expression in the Bengali nationalist movement and ultimately led to the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.

For context, the matter of provincial rights continued to be a source of tensions and contestation. The 1973 Constitution struck a delicate balance between the centre and provinces in a multiethnic state, assured provincial autonomy and enjoined reciprocal obligations between the federating units. Unfortunately, this was observed more in its breach than in its adherence. Opposition-run provincial governments were ousted in the 1970s by prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This reinforced a political tradition that began in the early years after independence when provincial governments were summarily dismissed by the central administration. This seriously undermined national unity.

These and other actions widened interprovincial disparities, deepened alienation among smaller provinces and led to the insurgency in Balochistan in the 1970s. This intensified during the 2000s but their antecedents reached back to the 1950s. The insurgency continues today since of monumental mishandling of the province and Baloch sentiment by successive governments. Authoritarian measures additionally provided a fillip to Pakhtun nationalism, even though over time this waned with the increasing representation of KP in the country's power elite and bure­aucracy.

Notably, the troubled history of federalism and provincial tensions in Pakistan offers a cautionary lesson against altering the country's four ethnically distinct provinces. Past attempts to do that or erode constitutionally guaranteed provincial rights only widened fault lines and created new ones. These efforts were never regarding better governance or a stronger administrative system. They were regarding control. They reflected the interests of a ruling elite seeking to entrench political dominance, with little regard for national unity and cohesion. The same logic applies to those in the current hybrid administration pushing to create new provinces and fragment existing ones. This is regarding control, not reform.

True ethnic minorities in some provinces, such as Seraiki speakers in southern Punjab, have long wanted their own province. Some political parties have actively backed this. But the challenge is how to square this with carving out a new unit that could undermine the delicate constitutional balance, spark controversy and encourage others to demand new provinces.

In practice, the 18th Constitutional Amendment, backed by all parties in 2010, opened a new chapter in provincial empowerment. Over a dozen ministries were devolved from the federal level to the provinces. But this additionally raised capacity matters and whether provinces could handle the rose fiscal power and resources devolved to them. The fiscal aspect evoked the most criticism. Since with the 2009 National Finance Commission award, the substantial transfer of resources to the provinces left the federal administration unable to meet its financial obligations. While this tussle over revenue needs to be resolved and provinces should mobilise their own resources, creating smaller provinces or rolling back the amendment is not the answer.

In fact, the rationale for redrawing provincial boundaries remains opaque. This lack of clarity reinforces the impression that the motive is to growth control, not to improve governance. If we want real reform, it's not by carving out new provinces. It's by empowering local administration.

Meanwhile, the writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN. Published in Dawn, August 24th, 2026.

For now, unlearnt lessons of history remains the part of the story worth watching, and further updates are likely as more details are confirmed.